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OFFICE OF THE  
CITY MANAGER

CITY OF SACRAMENTO  
CALIFORNIA

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October 2, 1991

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City Council  
Sacramento, California

Honorable Members in Session:

**SUBJECT: REFINEMENTS TO BASE MAP - 1991 REDISTRICTING PROCESS**

**LOCATION AND COUNCIL DISTRICT**

Citywide

**SUMMARY**

This report recommends that the City Council consider the staff report, review the modifications to the Option B submittal of the Latino Coalition for Fair Sacramento Redistricting/Summit on African American Concerns 1991 Redistricting Process and if changes are satisfactory, adopt the map and direct that this item be scheduled for pass for publication on October 22, 1991.

**BACKGROUND**

At the September 25 City Council meeting, it was decided to accept Option B submitted by the Latino Coalition for Fair Sacramento Redistricting/Summit on African American Concerns - 1991 Redistricting Project as the base map. The numbering of City Council Districts 7 and 8 were reversed by the City Council from what was submitted.

Staff was requested to work with the City Attorney's Office and to review Option B from the stand point of its adherence to the following principles: equal distribution of population; City Charter criteria; and the Voting Rights Act and Amendments. In addition, staff was also asked to review the major requests and issues presented by community residents at the nine public hearings, and the summary meeting to see where the map is consistent and where it conflicts with these items.

Four Council Members also asked staff to amend the Option B map submittal in order to accomplish the following:

1. Council Member Ferris. Place Woodlake in District 2 and Ben Ali in District 3.
2. Council Member Kastanis. Try to keep Valley Hi as much as possible a cohesive community of interest.
3. Council Member Fargo. Make technical refinements to Central City boundaries.
4. Council Member Pane. Include Newman Court and Almhurst Neighborhood area in District 3.

Attached are the outline materials which relate to equal distribution of population, City Charter criteria, Voting Rights Act and Amendments (legal memoranda) and a listing of the issues which arose during the nine community meetings and the summary meeting.

Staff will distribute the revised Option B map to Council Members and the public prior to the October 9 City Council meeting.

The schedule for final adoption of the new City Council district map is as follows:

October 9, 1991	Map adopted in concept
October 22, 1991	Pass for publication
October 30, 1991	Final Map adopted by ordinance

Map becomes effective in thirty days after final City Council action on October 30, 1991. This schedule will be adjusted should additional time be required for clarification or additional changes.

#### **FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The City Council has previously allocated \$10,000 for costs associated with the redistricting process. Thus far, expenditures have been within the budget amount. Additional costs have been experienced in the area of cable remote costs associated with the nine community meetings, as well as duplicating costs for summary materials and related items which staff has made available to the public. Total expenditures to date for the redistricting process are approximately \$6,000.

**POLICY CONSIDERATIONS**

The City Council has adopted Option B submitted by the Latino Coalition for Fair Sacramento Redistricting/Summit on African American Concerns 1991 Redistricting Project as the base map. In addition, the City Council has directed staff to make some refinements to the base map submittal for consideration at the October 9 meeting. Staff has also been asked to review amended Option B as it relates to equal distribution of population, the City Charter criteria and the Voting Rights Act as well as the key points made at the nine community meetings and the summary meeting on redistricting.


By Council policy, every effort has been made to make the redistricting process for the City of Sacramento an open process where citizen participation has been facilitated.

As the end of the process draws near, the City Council should review the issues and items outlined in the recommendation section and take appropriate action.

**MBE/WBE**

No goods or services are being purchased in this item.

Respectfully submitted,



**DAVID R. MARTINEZ**  
Deputy City Manager

RECOMMENDATION APPROVED:



**WALTER J. SLIPE**  
City Manager

For More Information Contact:

David R. Martinez, Deputy City Manager  
449-5704

For City Council meeting of October 9, 1991



## REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES

The following principles and guidelines provide a framework to evaluate redistricting proposals, and to provide guidance during the adoption of new Council District boundaries.

### I. PRINCIPLES

These principles are consistent with applicable laws governing the redistricting process and criteria contained in the City Charter.

#### A. Equal Distribution of Population

The redistricting process requires that Council Districts represent as practical as possible an equal distribution of population. According to the 1990 Census, each Council District should be nearly equal to 46,171 people.

#### B. Charter Criteria

The Sacramento City Charter requires that the following criteria be used when considering redistricting plans. Court rulings allow variations from the "Target" populations based on these criteria:

- \* Topography
- \* Geography
- \* Cohesiveness
- \* Continuity
- \* Integrity and Compactness of Territory
- \* Community of Interests of the Districts
- \* Existing Neighborhoods and Community Boundaries

#### C. Voting Rights Act

See Memorandum from the City Attorney's Office.



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**OFFICE OF THE  
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September 19, 1991

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Honorable Mayor and Members  
of the City Council  
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Honorable Members in Session:

**SUBJECT: REDISTRICTING - VOTING RIGHTS ACT,  
POPULATION EQUALITY**

At your September 11, 1991 special City Council meeting on redistricting you requested that this office report back to you for your meeting of September 25, 1991, on (1) the Federal Voting Rights Act ("the Act"); (2) the issue of including too many minorities in one district (thereby diluting minority voting influence in adjacent areas [the so-called "compactness issue"]); and (3) whether it is permissible to deviate from mathematical equality in population for council districts.

**SUMMARY**

The Act prohibits *intentional* discrimination against minorities. Intentional discrimination can include drawing district lines which split a geographic area containing politically cohesive minority voters where the reason for the split is to preserve incumbency. Even though there is no intent to discriminate, dividing a geographic area which contains a *majority* of politically cohesive minority voters can also violate the Act under certain circumstances. In addition, a "loading" of one district with minorities which dilutes their impact in neighboring areas can also violate the Act.

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Finally, the Courts have upheld redistricting maps that contain districts which deviate from exact mathematical equality where the basis of population deviation is clearly articulated using one or more of the criteria set forth in Charter Section 23.

## DISCUSSION

### I. The Voting Rights Act

Congress enacted the Act (42 U.S.C. §1973 *et seq.*) in 1965 as part of the comprehensive Civil Rights legislation designed to help "eradicate inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination." *Thornburg v. Gingles* (1986) 478 U.S. 30, 69; 92 L.Ed.2d 58. As originally enacted, §1973 stated:

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.

In 1982, Congress amended the Act because of the Supreme Court's decision in *City of Mobile v. Bolden* (1980) 446 U.S. 55, 57, 64 L.Ed.2d 57. *Bolden* held that an electoral scheme could not be challenged without a showing that the scheme was *intentionally* designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

Under the amendment, a plaintiff in a voting rights case must show that, based on all of the circumstances, the electoral process is "not equally open to participation by the members of a [racial or language minority] in that its members have fewer opportunities than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 41 U.S.C. §1973.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the Act can be violated by either

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<sup>1</sup> The full text of the amendment (42 U.S.C. §1973(b)) reads as follows:

"(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than

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intentional discrimination in the drawing of district lines or by facially neutral apportionment schemes that have the effect of diluting minority votes.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. Supreme Court first reviewed the 1982 amendments to the Act in *Thornburg v. Gingles, supra*, where a redistricting plan was challenged as impermissibly diluting the voting strength of black voters. The Supreme Court held that, in order to prevail under Section 2 of the Act, a plaintiff must establish all of the following:

1. That the minority group allegedly harmed by the government practice is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single district. Without a showing that at least one district could be legally created in which the minority group could constitute a majority of eligible voters, and therefore have increased influence in the electoral process, the minority group cannot claim to be harmed by the challenged practice;

2. That the minority group is politically cohesive. Unless the minority group is politically cohesive, it will not be able to elect a representative of choice, even where a district is established in which the minority group constitutes a majority of eligible voters;

3. That the white majority votes as a bloc to enable it -- in the absence of special circumstances, such as a minority candidate running unopposed -- to usually defeat the minority group's preferred candidate. The *Gingles* court stated that this third requirement generally may be established by a simple showing that the majority candidate is usually able to defeat the minority group's candidates. 478 U.S., 50-51; L.Ed.2d, 46-47.

*Gingles* stated that the trial court must also consider the "totality of the

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other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one of the circumstances which may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

<sup>2</sup> *Garza v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 1990) 918 F.2d 763, 766. By dilution of minority population, it is not clear whether the Court meant the splitting of areas containing a majority of minority population, or the splitting of any area containing minorities.



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circumstances" and determine, based on a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality, whether the political process is equally open to minority voters. 478 U.S., 50-51; 92 L.Ed.2d, 46-47. "This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case and requires an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested electoral mechanisms." *Id.* (citations omitted).

Applying this three-part test to the facts before it and looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Court held that, with one exception, the districts in *Gingles* violated Section 2 of the Act. 478 U.S., 80; 92 L.Ed.2d, 65.

Perhaps the most well-known case in California on the Act is *Garza v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 1990) 918 F.2d 763. In *Garza*, a group of Hispanics sought a redrawing of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors' district boundaries. The plaintiffs claimed that the existing boundaries were drawn to intentionally dilute the voting strength of Hispanics. The trial court found that the county had engaged in intentional discrimination in its 1959, 1965 and 1971 redistricting plans and had split a Hispanic "core" of residents into two different districts. The trial court found that the 1981 redistricting plan was designed primarily for the self-preservation of the incumbents, and that the Supervisors intended to create the very discriminatory result that occurred. *Id.* at 771.

The court then ordered the county to prepare a new redistricting plan. However, the court rejected the plan submitted by three of the Supervisors, finding it less than a good faith effort to remedy the existing violations. It then accepted and imposed a plan which created a district with a majority of Hispanic voting-age citizens.

On appeal, the county argued that the plaintiffs could not establish the first prong of the three-part *Gingles* test (geographic proximity of the minority voters to form a *majority* in a single-member district). The county argued that when the district boundaries were drawn in 1981, it was not possible to create a district with a majority of Hispanic voters.

The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that where there has been *intentional* dilution of minority strength, plaintiffs need not show that a district with a majority of minority voters could have been created. *Id.* at 769. (It was because of the explosive growth of the Hispanic community in the 1980s that the District Court was able to devise a district with a majority of Hispanic voters.)

The county also argued that the trial court made insufficient findings of intent to discriminate. It claimed that the Supervisors had only intended, with the 1981 redistricting plan, to preserve their incumbencies, and that this did not amount to intentional

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discrimination. However, the Court of Appeals held that while the Supervisors may have acted primarily on the political instinct of self-preservation, the means by which the Supervisors chose to achieve self-preservation was to fragment the Hispanic vote. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding that this fragmentation of voting strength resulted in a lessened opportunity for Hispanic participation in the political process, a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. *Id.* at 771.

Finally, the county argued that the trial court improperly based its reapportionment plan on total population, rather than voting population. It argued that because so many Hispanics in the county were non-citizens, concentrating the votes of Hispanic citizens in one district would unconstitutionally weight the votes of some citizens more than the votes of other citizens (in other districts).

The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, it noted that a fundamental principle of representative government is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, regardless of age, sex, race, or citizenship. Thus, basing districts on the number of voters instead of total population would result in serious population inequities across districts, limiting access to representatives for individuals in districts with high percentages of non-voting persons (including non-citizens and children). Second, the court found that California Elections Code §35000 requires that reapportionment be accomplished on the basis of total population, not voting age population. *Id.* at 773-776.

On the issue of loading or compacting of minorities into one district, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in *Gingles, supra*, that dilution of minority voting strength could occur ". . . from the concentration of [the minority] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority." *Id.* at 478.

## 2. Permissive Deviations<sup>3</sup> From Mathematical Equality

This issue was discussed at length in a memo dated April 11, 1991, to Deputy City Manager David Martinez and later sent to the Council. A copy of this memo is attached. To summarize, the City must make a good faith effort to create council districts as equal in population as is practical, taking into account the factors set forth in Charter Section 23:

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<sup>3</sup> Deviation here means the difference between the lowest and highest population districts expressed in percentage above and below the figure representing mathematical equality. Thus, if the district with the lowest population is 2% below mathematical equality, and the district with the highest population is 3% above, the deviation would be 5%.

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topography, geography, cohesiveness, continuity, integrity and compactness of territory, community of interests of the districts, existing neighborhoods, and community boundaries. While the courts will not closely scrutinize deviations between districts of 10% or less, the rationale for any deviation must be clearly articulated and necessary to achieve one or more of the above goals.

Respectfully submitted,



**SHARON SIEDORF CARDENAS,**  
City Attorney

SSC:lr



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**CITY OF SACRAMENTO  
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April 11, 1991

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**MEMORANDUM**

TO: David Martinez, Deputy City Manager

FROM: Theodore H. Kobey, Jr., Assistant City Attorney

RE: **RULES GOVERNING REAPPORTIONMENT  
OF COUNCIL DISTRICTS**

**QUESTION PRESENTED**

You have asked that we set forth the legal rules which govern Council redistricting.

**BRIEF ANSWER**

The applicable rule is that the City must make an honest and good faith effort to reapportion City Council districts so that they are as nearly of equal population as is practicable. Some divergences from strict population equality are constitutionally permissible so long as they are based on legitimate considerations which are incidental to the effectuation of a rational state policy. These considerations include the recognition of the integrity and continuity of legislative districts and the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines. The City will have the burden of demonstrating that any major divergence from strict population equality is justified, but minor variations will not establish a prima facie case of invalidity and hence will not require justification on the City's part. Section 24 of the City Charter requires redistricting to be accomplished within six months after the City's receipt of the census data.

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Re: Rules Governing Reapportionment  
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## DISCUSSION

I. The Basic Rule Governing City Redistricting. Since *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (which established the justiciability of apportionment of voting strength), the U.S. Supreme Court has established one rule of review applicable in the reapportionment of congressional districts and another less-strict rule (stated in the answer above) applicable in the reapportionment of state legislatures. The standard for reapportionment of congressional districts is that ". . . equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality. . . ." *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler* (1969) 394 U.S. 526, 531, 22 L.Ed.2d 519, 525.

The court clearly enunciated this dichotomy between federal and state reapportionment in *Mahan v. Howell* (1973) 410 U.S. 315, 320, 35 L.Ed.2d 320, 328. In *Chapman v. Meier* (1975) 420 U.S. 1, 22, 42 L.Ed.2d 766, 782, the court summarized this dichotomy and its approach generally to reapportionment issues as follows:

Since *Reynolds*, we have had the opportunity to observe attempts in many state legislative reapportionment plans to achieve the goal of population equality. Although each case must be evaluated on its own facts, and a particular population deviation from the ideal may be permissible in some cases but not in others, *Swann v. Adams*, 385 U.S. 440, 445, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, 87 S.Ct. 569 (1967), certain guidelines have been developed for determining compliance with the basic goal of one person, one vote. In *Swann* we held that a variance of 25.65% in one house and 33.55% in the other was impermissible absent 'a satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy.' *Id.*, at 444, 17 L.Ed.2d 501. See also *Kilgarlin v. Hill*, 386 U.S. at 123-124, 17 L.Ed.2d 771. In *Swann*, no justification of the divergences had been attempted. Possible justifications, each requiring adequate proof, were suggested by the Court. Among these were 'such state policy considerations as the integrity of political subdivisions, the maintenance of compactness and contiguity in legislative districts or the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines.' *Swann*, 385 U.S. at 444, 17 L.Ed.2d 501. See also *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. at 578-581, 12 L.Ed.2d 506.

On the other hand, we have acknowledged that some leeway in the equal-population requirement should be afforded states in devising their legislative reapportionment plans, as contrasted with congressional districting, where population equality appears now to be

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the preeminent, if not the sole, criterion on which to adjudge constitutionality. (Citations omitted.) For example, in *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 37 L.Ed.2d 298, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (1973), we permitted a deviation of 7.83% with no showing of invidious discrimination. In *White v. Regester, supra*, a variation of 9.9% was likewise permitted.

The treatment of the reapportionment plan in *Mahan v. Howell, supra*, is illustrative of our approach in this area. There, the Virginia Legislature had fashioned a plan providing a total population variance of 16.4% among house districts. This disparity was of sufficient magnitude to require an analysis of the state policies asserted in justification. We found that the deviations from the average were caused by the attempt of the legislature to fulfill the rational state policy of refraining from splitting political subdivisions between house districts, and we accepted the policy as legitimate notwithstanding the fact that subdivision splits were permitted in senatorial districts. Since the population divergences in the Virginia plan were 'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy,' *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. at 579, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, we held that the plan met constitutional standards. (Emphasis added.)

In accord: *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); *White v. Regester*, 412 U.S. 755, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); *NYC Board of Estimate v. Morris*, 489 U.S. \_\_\_\_, 103 L.Ed.2d 717, 727 (1989); *Brown v. Thompson*, 462 U.S. 835, 841, 77 L.Ed.2d 214, 221-222 (1983).

The rule applicable to local redistricting is that which is applicable to state legislative reapportionment. In *Abate v. Mundt*, 403 U.S. 182, 185, 29 L.Ed.2d 399, 402 (1971), a case which upheld the validity of a county legislative plan under which there was an 11.9% divergence<sup>1</sup> from population equality, the court stated:

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<sup>1</sup>"Divergence" as used in this context means the difference between the district most under-represented and the district most over-represented. In *Abate v. Mundt*, there was a 7.1% under-representation in one district and 4.8% over-representation in another.

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In assessing the constitutionality of various apportionment plans, we have observed that viable local governments may need considerable flexibility in municipal arrangements if they are to meet changing societal needs, *Sailors v. Board of Education*, 387 U.S. 105, 110-111, 18 L.Ed.2d 650, 654, 655, 87 S.Ct. 1549 (1967), and that a desire to preserve the integrity of political subdivisions may justify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality. *Reynolds v. Sims*, *supra*, at 578, 12 L.Ed.2d at 536. These observations, along with the facts that local legislative bodies frequently have fewer representatives than do their state and national counterparts and that some local legislative districts may have a much smaller population than do congressional and state legislative districts, lend support to the argument that slightly greater percentage deviations may be tolerable for local government apportionment schemes, cf. *ibid.* Of course, this Court has never suggested that certain geographic areas or political interests are entitled to disproportionate representation. Rather, our statements have reflected the view that the particular circumstances and needs of a local community as a whole may sometimes justify departures from strict equality.

See also *NYC Board of Estimate v. Morris*, *supra*, 103 L.Ed.2d 727.

The California Supreme Court, in *Calderon v. City of Los Angeles* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 251, followed the strict rule of review in striking down the Los Angeles charter provisions which expressly permitted a 10% deviation from mathematical equality in each council district. However, this opinion is of questionable authority for the proposition that the strict rule is applicable in reviewing a local redistricting plan because it was decided before the *Abate*, *Mahan*, *Gaffney*, and *White v. Regester* cases were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court in *Calderon* considered itself constrained ". . . to follow decisions of the [U.S.] Supreme Court on matters of constitutional interpretation. . . ." *Calderon*, *supra*, 4 Cal.3d 258. In view of this, there seems little question that the California courts would now follow the more recent U.S. Supreme Court cases and apply their somewhat less stringent standards.

However, we would strongly recommend against the adoption of any approach which automatically allows a fixed numerical departure from population equality. In the first place, ". . . an honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable" is still the yardstick. *Mahan v. Howell*, *supra*, 410 U.S. 324-325, 35 L.Ed.2d 330. The use of a preset mathematical deviation has the appearance of arbitrariness which might invite critical court scrutiny.

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Re: Rules Governing Reapportionment  
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In *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, the court in striking down a three percent (3%) variation stated:

We see no nonarbitrary way to pick a cutoff point at which population variances suddenly become de minimis. Moreover, to consider a certain range of variances de minimis would encourage legislators to strive for that range rather than for equality as nearly as practicable. The District Court found, for example, that at least one leading Missouri legislator deemed it proper to attempt to achieve a 2% level of variance rather than to seek population equality. 394 U.S. 526, 531, 22 L.Ed.2d 525.

The *Kirkpatrick* case involved congressional redistricting, but in *Abate v. Mundt, supra*, which involved a local legislative plan, the court stated:

Deviations from population equality must be justified by legitimate state considerations. *Swann v. Adams*, 385 U.S. 440, 444, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, 504, 87 S.Ct. 569 (1967). Because voting rights require highly sensitive safeguards, this Court has carefully scrutinized state interests offered to justify deviations from population equality. (29 L.Ed.2d 402.)

As mentioned earlier, in *Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, supra*, the California Supreme Court struck down a Los Angeles City Council redistricting plan which expressly allowed a ten percent (10%) variance. The Court's reasons closely followed those given by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Kirkpatrick, supra*, and seem as cogent now as then:

The reasons for eschewing such formulae are not far to seek. First, it is practically impossible, without being arbitrary, to choose a cutoff point at which population deviations suddenly become de minimis. Second, use of such yardsticks encourages drafters of apportionment plans to employ the 'acceptable' variations as a starting point, instead of striving for equality.

2. The Burden of Proving Invalidity of City Redistricting. The present rule is stated in *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 744, 37 L.Ed.2d 298, 307 (1973):

On the other hand, as *Mahan v. Howell* demonstrates, population deviations among districts may be sufficiently large to require justification but nonetheless be justifiable and legally sustainable. It



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is now time to recognize, in the context of the eminently reasonable approach of *Reynolds v. Sims*, that minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.

*Gaffney* validated the Connecticut State Legislature redistricting wherein the population of the smallest State Senate district was 1.81% smaller than the largest, and the population of the smallest House district was 7.83% smaller than the largest.


Section 23 of the City Charter provides as follows:

District standards.

Council districts shall be as nearly equal in population as required under the federal and state constitutions. In establishing or changing the boundaries of districts, consideration shall be given to the following factors: topography, geography, cohesiveness, continuity, integrity and compactness of territory, community of interests of the districts, existing neighborhoods and community boundaries.

The Charter thus requires adherence to the rule stated above. In addition, it appears to require consideration of criteria other than strict population equality similar to those which have been suggested by cases such as *Swann v. Adams, supra*, 385 U.S. 444, 17 L.Ed.2d 504 (integrity of political subdivisions, the maintenance of compactness and continuity in legislative districts, and the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines).

SHARON SIEDORF CARDENAS,  
City Attorney

  
THEODORE H. KOBAY, JR.,  
Assistant City Attorney

THK/jms



0700  
Val  
RECEIVED  
CITY CLERKS OFFICE  
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OCT 8 2 32 PM '91

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October 7, 1991

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**MEMORANDUM:**

**TO: Mayor Rudin and City Council Members**

**SUBJECT: STAFF RECOMMENDATION FOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE ADOPTED BASE MAP**

To facilitate the review and decision process attached is the staff recommendation for the City's Council District boundaries. The attached map reflects Council's instructions for changes to the adopted base map as discussed at the September 25 Redistricting meeting.

the changes are:

- Place Woodlake to District 2 and Ben Ali in District 3.
- Include Newman Court and Alhurst Neighborhood area in District 3.
- Make technical refinements to Central City boundaries.
- Try to keep Valley Hi, as much as possible, as a cohesive community of interest.

These materials are being shared with each of the groups and individuals who submitted maps on August 23, 1991.

Should you have any questions, please contact Gary Ziegenfuss or me.

Sincerely,



**DAVID R. MARTINEZ**  
Deputy City Manager

Attachment

c: Walter Slipe  
Bill Edgar  
Redistricting Staff Task Force



**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BASE MAP (OPTION B)  
AND THE STAFF RECOMMENDATION  
REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES - EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION**

Population Statistics  
and Deviation from Target  
Population (46,171)

**STAFF RECOMMENDATION:**

**BASE MAP**

	Population	Deviation: Persons	Deviation: Percentage	Population	Deviation: Persons	Deviation: Percentage
District 1	45,658	-513	-1.11%	44,805	-1,366	-2.96%
District 2	46,406	+235	+0.51%	45,590	-581	-1.26%
District 3	45,927	-244	-0.53%	44,293	-1,878	-4.07%
District 4	44,808	-1,363	-2.45%	45,963	-208	0.45%
District 5	46,039	-132	-0.29%	46,039	-132	0.29%
District 6	45,601	-570	-1.23%	47,749	+1,578	+3.42%
District 7	49,322	+3,151	+6.82%	46,787	+616	+1.33%
District 8	45,604	-567	-1.23%	48,139	+1,968	+4.26%
<u>Overall Deviation: Lowest to Highest</u>	9.77%			8.33%		

**AND THE STAFF RECOMMENDATION  
REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES - VOTING RIGHTS ACT - ETHNICITY**

<b>TOTAL POPULATION STATISTICS</b>	<b>STAFF RECOMMENDATION</b>	<b>BASE MAP</b>
District 1 Asian Latino Black	7.8% 21.3% 13.4%	7.7% 21.8% 13.5%
District 2 Asian Latino Black	9.8% 15.7% 18.5%	9.9% 15.9% 18.8%
District 3 Asian Latino Black	4.3% 10.3% 4.5%	3.8% 9.8% 4.3%
District 4 Asian Latino Black	26.4% 10.3% 8.6%	26.0% 10.6% 8.5%
District 5 Asian Latino Black	14.3% 25.1% 16.0%	14.3% 25.1% 16.0%
District 6 Asian Latino Black	15.9% 16.0% 9.8%	15.9% 15.7% 9.7%
District 7 Asian Latino Black	13.7% 19.8% 32.1%	13.9% 19.8% 32.6%
District 8 Asian Latino Black	23.5% 11.0% 13.8%	22.8% 11.4% 14.4%

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BASE MAP (OPTION B)  
AND THE STAFF RECOMMENDATION  
REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES - VOTING RIGHTS ACT - ETHNICITY**

<b>TOTAL POPULATION STATISTICS +18yrs</b>	<b>STAFF RECOMMENDATION</b>	<b>BASE MAP</b>
District 1 Asian Latino Black	7.5% 18.8% 12.1%	7.8% 19.2% 12.2%
District 2 Asian Latino Black	7.3% 13.9% 17.0%	7.4% 14.1% 17.3%
District 3 Asian Latino Black	4.1% 9.2% 4.2%	3.6% 8.7% 4.0%
District 4 Asian Latino Black	25.7% 8.9% 7.3%	25.2% 9.2% 7.2%
District 5 Asian Latino Black	11.2% 22.0% 15.3%	11.2% 22.0% 15.3%
District 6 Asian Latino Black	12.8% 13.9% 8.6%	12.9% 13.7% 8.3%
District 7 Asian Latino Black	12.8% 17.5% 30.0%	13.0% 17.5% 30.4%
District 8 Asian Latino Black	22.7% 9.7% 12.8%	22.8% 10.2% 13.3%

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BASE MAP (OPTION B)  
AND THE STAFF RECOMMENDATION  
REDISTRICTING PRINCIPLES - CRITERIA**

<b>CRITERIA</b>	<b>STAFF RECOMMENDATION</b>	<b>BASE MAP</b>
Topography	1	1
Geography	1	1
Cohesiveness Continuity Compactness	2	2
Community of Interest	2	2
Existing Neighborhoods and Community Boundaries	2 - 3	2 - 3
Comments	<p>This proposal does not split the Pocket community and South Land Park Hills in District 4. This alternative improves the base map by putting slightly more people into Valley High. The recommendation makes adjustments to other districts as per Council direction and redistricting principles.</p> <p>District 7 and 8 still have long and linear boundaries crossing community planning areas.</p>	<p>This map is an improvement of the original Latino/1991 redistricting project proposal. The Pocket community is not split, and South Land Park Hills has been placed back into District 4. However, the Valley High community has been split.</p> <p>District 7 and 8 still have long and linear boundaries crossing community plan area.</p>

**1=VERY CONSISTENT**

**2=CONSISTENT**

**3=SOMEWHAT CONSISTENT**

**4=NOT CONSISTENT**

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BASE MAP (OPTION B)**

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BASE MAP (OPTION B)  
AND THE STAFF RECOMMENDATION  
REDISTRICTING GUIDELINES**

ISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONS	STAFF RECOMMENDATION	BASE MAP
Meadowview in One District	Yes	Yes
Oak Park in One Community	Yes	Yes
Southside Neighborhood in District 1	Yes (Portion West of 7th/8th Streets)	No
Woodlake Neighborhood in District 2	Yes	No
One Council District in the Central City	No	No
District 3 Should Have a Better Ethnic Balance	Yes (Improves Ethnicity of Base Map)	Yes
Keep Pocket Greenhaven in One Community	Yes	Yes
Ben Ali Neighborhood in District 3	Yes	No
Keep South Land Park Hills Neighborhood in District 4	Yes	Yes



## ALTERNATIVE 1

DISTRICT	POPULATION GROUP	TOTAL POPULATION	RACE, ALL PERSONS					HISPANIC	RACE, NON - HISPANIC PERSONS					TOTAL HOUSING
			White	Black	Am. Ind.- Eskimo- Aleut	Asian- Pacific Islander	Other Race		White	Black	Am. Ind.- Eskimo- Aleut	Asian- Pacific Islander	Other Race	
1	All Persons	45,658	30,038	6,280	638	3,784	4,918	9,744	25,607	6,107	510	3,560	130	19,942
	Age 18+ Yrs	34,881 76.4%	24,101 65.8%	4,329 13.8%	494 1.4%	2,753 8.3%	3,204 10.8%	6,543 21.3%	21,015 56.1%	4,222 13.4%	407 1.1%	2,607 7.8%	87 0.3%	
2	All Persons	46,406	28,768	8,839	900	4,769	3,130	7,273	25,204	8,586	702	4,544	97	17,145
	Age 18+ Yrs	30,892 66.6%	20,740 62.0%	5,359 19.0%	582 1.9%	2,380 10.3%	1,831 6.7%	4,288 15.7%	18,575 54.3%	5,241 18.5%	475 1.5%	2,262 9.8%	51 0.2%	
3	All Persons	45,927	39,025	2,158	542	2,068	2,134	4,751	36,632	2,068	428	1,958	90	24,871
	Age 18+ Yrs	39,617 86.3%	34,135 85.0%	1,712 4.7%	428 1.2%	1,695 4.5%	1,647 4.6%	3,656 10.3%	32,280 79.8%	1,652 4.5%	350 0.9%	1,615 4.3%	64 0.2%	
4	All Persons	44,808	26,085	3,966	336	12,137	2,284	4,616	24,197	3,835	264	11,833	63	20,995
	Age 18+ Yrs	36,035 80.4%	22,037 58.2%	2,703 8.9%	252 0.7%	9,474 27.1%	1,569 5.1%	3,215 10.3%	20,668 54.0%	2,634 8.6%	211 0.6%	9,268 26.4%	39 0.1%	
5	All Persons	46,039	23,536	7,693	709	6,906	7,195	11,551	19,889	7,386	491	6,565	157	18,619
	Age 18+ Yrs	32,357 70.3%	18,663 51.1%	5,136 16.7%	441 1.5%	3,796 15.0%	4,321 15.6%	7,117 25.1%	16,246 43.2%	4,962 16.0%	331 1.1%	3,620 14.3%	81 0.3%	
6	All Persons	45,601	28,958	4,641	594	7,476	3,932	7,300	26,006	4,473	446	7,248	128	17,396
	Age 18+ Yrs	33,412 73.3%	23,196 63.5%	2,973 10.2%	409 1.3%	4,414 16.4%	2,420 8.6%	4,656 16.0%	21,200 57.0%	2,887 9.8%	318 1.0%	4,287 15.9%	64 0.3%	
8	All Persons	45,604	25,812	6,513	247	11,052	1,980	5,011	23,296	6,303	201	10,720	73	17,535
	Age 18+ Yrs	32,740 71.8%	19,381 56.6%	4,278 14.3%	166 0.5%	7,618 24.2%	1,297 4.3%	3,188 11.0%	17,765 51.1%	4,178 13.8%	139 0.4%	7,423 23.5%	47 0.2%	
7	All Persons	49,322	19,741	16,431	595	7,234	5,321	9,761	16,326	15,851	450	6,757	177	16,859
	Age 18+ Yrs	32,750 66.4%	14,755 40.0%	10,121 33.3%	359 1.2%	4,448 14.7%	3,067 10.8%	5,728 19.8%	12,651 33.1%	9,813 32.1%	288 0.9%	4,191 13.7%	79 0.4%	
CITY TOTALS	All Persons	369,365	221,963	56,521	4,561	55,426	30,894	60,007	197,157	54,609	3,492	53,185	915	153,362
	Age 18+ Yrs	272,684 73.8%	177,008 60.1%	36,611 15.3%	3,131 1.2%	36,578 15.0%	19,356 8.4%	38,391 14.1%	160,400 53.4%	35,589 14.8%	2,519 0.9%	35,273 14.4%	512 0.2%	